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External liberalization, specialization, and institutional change in times of  
globalization: The case of central, east and southeast Europe 
Richard Frensch 
During the early nineties, central, east and southeast European countries set on liberalizing their economies on an 
unprecedented scale, including more or less speedy or profound external liberalizations in country-specific 
approaches. Since then, we have observed increasingly differentiated changes in these countries’ legal institutions. 
Based on a small but growing literature, we may conjecture that both observations do not only describe a 
chronological sequence but a causal relationship. This note discusses this conjecture and argues that the 
globalization of production processes acts as a channel in this causal relationship. Whether or not trade 
liberalization helps in improving countries’ domestic legal institutions depends on the nature of openness emanating 
from liberalization: some countries firms’ joined fragmented, globalized production processes, for others, the 
dependence on primary products even increased. 
 
Liberalization, trade and trade patterns 
External liberalizations in central, east and southeast 
Europe (CESEE) during the early nineties were followed 
by tremendous increases in the region’s external trade, 
about four times as large as the growth of world trade. 
Figure 1: Real exports, Selected CESEEs vs. World 
(1962 – 2007) 
 
Source: Levchenko and Zhang (2012), based on UN ComTrade. 
CESEEs: Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Esto-
nia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Russia, Ukraine, 
and Kazachstan. 
 
 
In a regional perspective, most of this trade has been 
with western European neighbours. 
Figure 2: CESEEs share in total western Europe’s im-
ports, 1962 – 2007 
 
Source: Levchenko and Zhang (2012).  
CESEEs as in Figure 1; western Europe is the EU-15 plus Iceland, 
Norway, and Switzerland. 
 
In terms of trade patterns, this massive expansion can 
to a large degree be accounted for by (i) trade growth, 
specifically of goods used in production, i.e., parts, 
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components and final capital goods and transport 
equipment, and other intermediate goods (see Figure 3 
for CESEE exports to their most prominent destination 
in Western Europe, i.e., Germany), and (ii) a strong rise 
in newly traded goods, rather than volume growth in 
already traded goods (see Eck, 2009). Of course, these 
trade pattern changes were more or less pronounced 
from country to country. 
Figure 3: Average annual rates of change of exports to 
Germany, split into growth contributions of different 
goods categories (1995 – 2010) 
 
Source: Own computations, based on UN ComTrade. 
Negative bars have to be subtracted from positive bars to obtain total 
growth rates. Data include all goods except fuels and lubricants; The 
United Nations Statistics Division’s Classification by BEC (Broad  
Economic Categories, available online at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ 
cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=10&Lg=1) allows for headings of trade no-
menclatures (SITC or HS) to be grouped and rearranged, on the basis 
of trade nomenclature categories’ main end use, to approximate the 
basic System of National Accounts (SNA) activities: primary goods, 
intermediate goods, capital goods, and consumer goods. 
 
 
Trade patterns and the globalization of production  
Technical change in production is driven by fragmenta-
tion, i.e., deepening the division of labour by splitting up 
production processes into increasing numbers of 
smaller production processes or tasks, resulting in in-
creasing numbers of parts, components and final goods 
as the outputs of these tasks. Fragmentation makes 
more specialization possible and may potentially lead to 
the dislocation of individual tasks. This dislocation of 
tasks may take on international dimensions, leading to 
the globalization of production processes in the form of 
international vertical production networks of firms along 
the value chain. This process appears to be especially 
relevant for the production of transport equipment and 
capital goods in general.  
The liberalization and external opening up of CESEE 
countries during the early nineties occurred nearly simul-
taneously with significant strives towards the globaliza-
tion of production. Thus, the early nineties were a par-
ticularly good time for integrating into international 
vertical production networks. The changing trade pat-
terns of the CESEE countries, put into effect by external 
liberalizations, indeed signal that many firms joined inter-
national – especially east-west European – vertical pro-
duction networks, formed especially in the automobile 
industry, but also in transport equipment more generally, 
and in fact in the whole area of capital goods production. 
Vertical production networks have most prominently – 
but not exclusively – been formed between establish-
ments in Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hun-
gary and Poland (IMF, 2013). 
As the CESEE countries are relatively labour-rich 
compared to western Europe, the a priori expectation 
is to see their firms specializing on labour-intensive 
tasks within European production networks. This was 
indeed the case at the outset, where it is important to 
note that factor intensities do not inform about the 
position of tasks along the value chain: in CESEE 
countries, both parts and components as well as final 
capital goods and transport equipment are all being 
produced, implying strong bilateral trade flows in parts, 
components, and final capital goods across Europe 
(see Frensch et al., 2012). This results in both sub-
stantial western European value added in CESEE 
countries’ exports, as much as the other way round. 
This is exemplified in Figure 4 for the most prominent 
case of this integration by vertical production net-
works, Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hun-
gary and Poland. 
Figure 4: Composition of total exports by source of value 
added (percent) 
 
Source: IMF (2013). 
 
But why have western European firms joined espe-
cially central, east and southeast European counter-
parts to form specifically European vertical production 
networks? Can’t the rest of the world offer to western 
Europe what the CESEE countries can offer? 
From the point of view of comparative advantage a coun-
try can “offer” specialization in production and trade: the 
more similar two countries, the less they have to offer to 
each other. For a worldwide sample of 79 countries (of 
which 17 are west European, 14 CESEE, with the re-
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maining 46 pretty well matching the rest of the world), 
Levchenko und Zhang (2012) estimate, on the basis of 
19 different industrial sectors, similarity indices of sec-
toral productivities. The similarity of sectoral productivity 
vectors between the CESEE average and the average of 
the rest of the world is very high, with a coefficient of 
correlation beyond 0.9! I.e., from the perspective of 
western Europe, CESEEs represent a group of different 
countries that mirror the rest of the world quite well – but 
are closer, and thus cheaper to trade with. 
Table 1: GDP-weighted correlations of sectoral labour 
productivities  
With  
CESEEs 
With western  
Europe  
With rest of  
the world 
Netherlands 0.282  Estonia 0.533 CESEEs  0.9 
Ireland 0.417  Kazakhstan 0.537   
Germany 0.880  Russia 0.820   
Switzerland 0.928  Poland 0.921   
Finland 0.926  Slovenia 0.916   
      
Pairwise correlations    
Netherlands – Russia      0.16    
Germany – Estonia     0.474    
Germany – Poland     0.984    
Source: Levchenko and Zhang (2012).  
 
Traditional welfare assessments of external liberali-
zations 
Episodes of external liberalization in the order of magni-
tude as happened in central, east and southeast 
Europe during the early nineties are rare – and are 
welcomed by trade economists as offering natural ex-
periments for quantitative studies on the welfare gains 
from liberalization. 
With comparative advantages determining specializa-
tion and trade, welfare gains from trade depend – 
apart from outright declining trade costs – upon coun-
try sizes (with larger countries being less open on 
average than smaller ones) and structural differences 
between countries. Thus, CESEEs that are more simi-
lar to western Europe stand less to gain compared to 
those that are less similar. Consider the examples of 
Poland versus Estonia, where the first is structurally 
much more similar to Western Europe than the sec-
ond. Accordingly, Poland’s welfare gains from liberaliz-
ing its trade (less than 4%) are much smaller than 
Estonia’s (beyond 17%). 
The gains for western Europe from liberalizing CESEEs 
can be viewed as gains of now also being able to trade 
with CESEEs, on top of the existing possibilities to trade 
with the rest of the world. As from the point of view of 
western Europe, CESEEs on average are very similar 
to the rest of the world, these gains are comparatively 
small, and welfare gains accruing to western Europe 
are confined to declining trade costs.  
Table 2: Welfare gains from CEESE liberalization in west-
ern and eastern Europe, without factor reallocation  
West  ∆ Welfare (%) East  ∆ Welfare (%) 
Austria  0.388 Bulgaria 10.566  
Belgium–Luxembourg 0.119 Czech Republic 6.033
Denmark  0.170 Estonia  17.251
Finland  0.240 Hungary  7.860
France  0.074 Kazakhstan  6.777
Germany  0.213 Latvia  11.931
Greece  0.136 Lithuania  8.911
Iceland  0.180 Macedonia, FYR 8.733
Ireland  0.157 Poland  3.891
Italy  0.126 Romania  6.848
Netherlands  0.120 Russian Federation 2.349
Norway  0.100 Slovak Republic  8.053
Portugal  0.024 Slovenia  6.702
Spain  0.058 Ukraine  5.263
Sweden  0.170 Mean  7.941
Switzerland  0.079  
United Kingdom  0.066  
Mean  0.142 Mean 7.941
Source: Levchenko and Zhang (2012).  
Welfare gains from liberalization compare autarky to trade costs in the early 2000s, without 
factor reallocation across sectors. 
 
However, productivity and welfare changes resulting from 
external liberalization may well go beyond static, once and 
for all gains from exploiting comparative advantages:  
 Trade opening induces reallocations from relatively 
less to relatively more productive sectors of the 
economy, or firms within sectors.  
 External liberalization and subsequent specialization 
tends to be accompanied by foreign direct invest-
ment, e.g., into capacities for vertical production 
networks, from which in turn productivity gains will 
spill over into purely domestic production. 
 Vertical production networks create strong ties be-
tween different countries’ industrial production, and 
thus induce synchronization of business cycles: for 
the east-west European case, strong German export 
dependence will spill over to CESEEs.  
 Recent research identifies institutions as the root cause 
of cross-country differences in incomes and productiv-
ities. If external liberalization were to affect institutional 
change, this effect might potentially dwarf all others 
that external liberalizations might bring about. 
 
Institutional change: Liberalization, export patterns 
and the Rule of Law  
Trade patterns react to the quality of – especially legal – 
institutions which can strengthen or weaken comparative 
advantages (Nunn and Trefler, 2013). At the heart of this 
influence lies a combination of hold-up problems and 
incomplete contracts, according to which a more com-
plex organization of production profits from a more com-
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plete legal setting of rights and responsibilities between 
the partners in production. A more complete legal setting, 
in turn, is brought about by a higher quality of legal insti-
tutions that economists routinely refer to as Rule of Law, 
a notion that stresses in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement and property rights. Accordingly, the better 
the Rule of Law, the less contested and insecure the 
distribution of the returns to investment will be in complex 
production processes, and the smaller the investment 
inefficiency due to that insecurity. Consequently, coun-
tries with a better Rule of Law specialize and export rela-
tively more in industries that are “Rule-of-Law-intensive,” 
i.e., industries that are characterized by a high complex-
ity of production processes. 
That in turn more international openness should have a 
positive impact on the quality of institutions has actually 
been postulated for quite some time already, especially 
on historical examples, as of opening up the Atlantic 
trade since the 16th century that strengthened the mer-
chant class to subsequently act as a lobby for institu-
tional change. A more stringent theoretical justification 
for this conjecture has recently been put forward by 
Levchenko (2012): 
 As already noted, a good Rule of Law generates 
comparative advantage in industries that are charac-
terized by a high complexity of production processes. 
 A bad Rule of Law results in a lack of security about 
the returns to an investment: thus, it may generate 
rents for non-investors, i.e., participants in the produc-
tion process other than the investors, e.g., trade un-
ions or upstream or downstream producers in produc-
tion networks. In consequence, these non-investors 
may use their rents to lobby for a bad Rule of Law.  
Figure 5: Rule of Law, average versus standard deviation 
 
Source: Own computations, based on Worldbank data, for 1996 – 2006. 
Rule of Law is normalized within –2.5 and +2.5, to measures “the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the 
police, and the courts as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
(Worldwide Governance Indicators, online at: http://info.worldbank.org/ 
governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports). In this and the following 
figures, western countries (unlabelled in Figure 5) comprise Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the USA. 
 However, opening up the economy to international 
competition may force non-investors to lobby for a 
better Rule of Law in their country, unless they 
want to lose all their rents to foreign producers that 
already work under a better Rule of Law. 
Consequently, opening a country up to trade may im-
prove legal institutional quality; and in the long run, 
countries that have a comparative advantage in Rule-
of-Law-intensive goods – that is not based on the Rule 
of Law itself – will tend to have a better Rule of Law. 
To observe these forces at work, we need to observe 
variety in legal institutions, but institutions are persistent 
and change in episodes rather than continuously. One of 
these episodes, however, is the transition of formerly 
planned economies in central, east and southeast Europe. 
Figure 5 records the comparatively high volatility in the 
Rule of Law of CESEE countries over time, during the 
decade following their liberalization, and also shows the 
gain in cross-country variation in the Rule of Law when 
adding these countries to a pool of western European and 
North American countries. To take an example: for that 
decade, the Rule of Law indicator for Slovenia averaged 
slightly less than 1, while its volatility during this decade 
can be described by the standard variation of about 0.2. 
This is a much higher standard variation than for the non-
CESEE countries in Figure 5, which witnessed very little 
change of their Rule of Law in that particular period of time. 
Figure 6: Openness and Rule of Law 
 
Source: Own computations, based on data from the EBRD, the 
Worldbank, and UN ComTrade. 
The shaded area illustrates the 95% confidence band around the 
estimated line of regression. 
 
Using the same pool of countries like in Figure 5, Figure 6 
juxtaposes countries’ openness, as defined by total ex-
ports relative to GDP, with their respective Rule of Law, 
all averaged over the decade following CESEE countries’ 
liberalization. While this figure indeed illustrates a positive 
relationship between openness and the Rule of Law in a 
cross-country context, two remarks are in order: first, the 
rather broad shaded band around the line of regression 
signals a lack of statistical significance for the postulated 
positive relationship.  
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Second, in this figure, the endogeneity, i.e., the recipro-
cal nature of influence between trade patterns and insti-
tutions is not taken care of: we know that openness, as 
measured with actual trade data depends on the quality 
of legal institutions. Therefore, in order to say anything 
empirically meaningful on the influence of trade patterns 
on institutions, the reciprocal influence has to be cut off. 
This can be done via a two-step approach (see Frensch, 
2013; for an alternative approach, see Levchenko, 2012): 
in the first step, we construct “predetermined” openness 
measures for different categories of goods that are inde-
pendent from the respective country’s Rule of Law.  
Whether production and trade is in consumer goods, capi-
tal or intermediate goods makes an enormous difference 
in terms of the complexity of use, as witnessed by the fact 
that elasticities of substitution differ markedly between use 
categories. Goods used in production are by far more 
complementary than consumer gods, this is again even 
more true for intermediate goods, and here in particular for 
these goods that form the core of fragmentation and dislo-
cation driving the globalization of production. Fragmented 
processes of production are particularly prone to hold-up 
problems connected with incomplete contracts, and can 
thus a priori be assumed to benefit most from improve-
ments in the quality of legal institutions. Thus, we will con-
centrate on trade flows and resulting openness measures 
generated by fragmented production processes that can 
be supposed to be Rule-of-Law intensive: capital goods, 
transport equipment, and their parts and components. 
However, we do not use observed openness measures. 
Rather, we determine openness measures, within a grav-
ity approach, purely on the basis of geography (especially 
distance to export markets) and the degree of trade liber-
alization that is exogenous for transition countries as part 
of IMF programs during their liberalization. By construction 
then, countries’ “predetermined” openness measures are 
independent from the countries’ Rule of Law. 
In a second step, we then regress the quality of the 
Rule of Law on predetermined openness measures. 
Figure 7 illustrates the result of this two-step procedure. 
It shows a positive relationship that by construction can 
be understood as causal, between a measure of prede-
termined openness in capital goods, transport equip-
ment and their respective parts and components, all 
generated by fragmented, Rule-of-Law intensive pro-
duction processes, and the Rule of Law. Accordingly, a 
country’s firms’ “natural potential” to be – due to geo-
graphic location and degree of trade liberalization – part 
of fragmented production processes within vertical pro-
duction networks should in the long run positively influ-
ence the quality of the country’s legal institutions.  
The figure suggests that the positive legal institutional 
developments of specifically the central European and 
Baltic countries was at least in part brought about by 
their substantial involvement in fragmented production 
processes within European vertical production net-
works. This has been true to only lesser degrees for 
Southeast European, and to much lesser degrees for 
former Soviet Union countries.  
Figure 7: Predetermined sectoral openness measures 
and Rule of Law 
 
 
Source: Own computations, based on data from the EBRD, the 
Worldbank, and UN ComTrade. 
The shaded area illustrates the 95% confidence band around the 
estimated line of regression. 
 
Of course, other influences must be at work as well: 
Figure 7 reveals that there is a large amount of Rule of 
Law variation between countries with identical prede-
termined openness in goods generated by fragmented 
production processes. These other influences, as ar-
gued at length in Levchenko (2012), should most nota-
bly include the quality of political institutions and legal 
traditions. 
Other influences, however, may also include influences 
on the Rule of Law from predetermined openness in 
goods other than those generated by fragmented pro-
duction processes. Figure 7 also shows a very specific 
feature of the well known “resource curse”, according to 
which economic development is hindered by a country’s 
heavy reliance on producing and exporting primary 
goods: the negative relationship between countries’ 
predetermined openness in terms of primary commodi-
ties and the Rule of Law is well in line with our picture of 
the role of the Rule of Law in the economy as devel-
oped above: concentration on primary commodity pro-
duction and trade creates rents that are potentially eas-
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ily contestable and insecure, as evidenced amply by the 
recent economic history of Russia and other former 
Soviet Union countries. This cannot work in favour of a 
good Rule of Law. 
 
Conclusions  
External liberalization in central, east and southeast 
Europe happened during a phase of intensifying global-
ization of production, enabling firms from the region – “as 
if” a representative sample from the rest of the world – to 
join east-west European vertical production networks, 
especially in transport equipment, but also in capital pro-
duction generally, concentrating at least initially on la-
bour-intensive tasks. 
Within international vertical production networks, CE-
SEE firms are present in all stages of production. Thus, 
the effects of liberalization on countries’ trade patterns 
show up most prominently in newly traded parts, com-
ponents, capital goods and transport equipment. 
Apart from well-known welfare gains from liberalization, 
this specific pattern of specialization and trade – most 
prominently observed in Hungary, Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia – can be argued to have as-
sisted in bringing about fundamental institutional con-
sequences. It has done so together with political institu-
tions and legal traditions, but potentially in conflict with 
other patterns of specialization that do not favour a 
positive legal institutional change, such as specifically a 
specialization on primary production. 
While this sounds like a belated triumph of Washington 
Consensus based transition programs during the early 
nineties, two caveats are in order: 
 There is no reason to assume that Washington Con-
sensus based transition programs during the early 
nineties led to a generally better quality of institutions. 
While trade liberalisation may ceteris paribus positively 
impact Rule of Law, there is ample suspicion of nega-
tive effects of other program elements on the quality of 
institutions, especially in the field of privatisation.  
 While much of the argument above was for a race to the 
top of the quality of legal institutions in response to liber-
alization, there is evidence on globalization processes to 
induce a race to the bottom in terms of the quality of la-
bour market institutions, at least when this quality is 
judged from the perspective of labour. If both views are 
correct, they together shape an interesting choice for 
participants in the economic policy lobbying game. 
Whether or not recent steps taken towards deeper trade 
liberalization by EU Association Agreements, concluded 
with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, might help to not 
only increase welfare by trade gains, but by improving 
the Rule of Law would then depend on the nature of 
“more openness” emanating from this further liberaliza-
tion: will these countries’ firms join fragmented, global-
ized production processes, or will their dependence on 
primary products even be increased, because this is all 
they have to offer, at least in the short and medium term? 
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